Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring

DOI10.1007/s00182-017-0569-7zbMath1411.91125OpenAlexW2590634914MaRDI QIDQ1684128

Heng Liu

Publication date: 8 December 2017

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0569-7

zbMATH Keywords

correlationrepeated gamescheap talkimperfect monitoringmediated communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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