Cheap talk with an exit option: a model of exit and voice

DOI10.1007/S00182-017-0571-0zbMath1411.91128OpenAlexW2189457982MaRDI QIDQ1684129

Takashi Shimizu

Publication date: 8 December 2017

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0571-0

zbMATH Keywords

voicecredibilityexitcheap talkinformativeness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (3)

Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: the single-crossing case ⋮ Cheap talk with an exit option: a model of exit and voice ⋮ Strategic information transmission with sender's approval

Cites Work

• Veto-based delegation
• Cheap talk with an exit option: a model of exit and voice
• Cheap talk with an exit option: the case of discrete action space
• A Simple Model of Voice
• Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria

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