Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game

DOI10.1007/s00182-017-0570-1zbMath1411.91023OpenAlexW2268475858WikidataQ59612813 ScholiaQ59612813MaRDI QIDQ1684135

Anna Stepanova, Edward J. P. Cartwright

Publication date: 8 December 2017

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00182-017-0570-1

zbMATH Keywords

thresholdquantal responsepublic goodforced contributionimpulse balance theoryordinal potential

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Public goods (91B18)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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