A representation theorem for frequently irrational agents

DOI10.1007/s10992-016-9408-8zbMath1422.91247OpenAlexW2514546801WikidataQ59886865 ScholiaQ59886865MaRDI QIDQ1685154

Edward Elliott

Publication date: 13 December 2017

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/103405/1/JPL%20Revision_FinalSubmission.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

utilitiesrepresentation theorempreferencescredencesirrational agents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Related Items (1)

Betting against the Zen monk: on preferences and partial belief

Cites Work

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