A new perspective on the classical Cournot duopoly

DOI10.3934/jdg.2017019zbMath1386.91021OpenAlexW2762981148MaRDI QIDQ1686347

Igor V. Evstigneev, Rabah Amir

Publication date: 22 December 2017

Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2017019

zbMATH Keywords

symmetryexistenceuniquenessCournot duopolypotential gamespure-strategy Nash equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

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• Entry, exit, and imperfect competition in the long run.
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• Potential games
• Cournot games with biconcave demand
• A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications
• On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium
• Uniqueness of Cournot Equilibrium: New Results from Old Methods
• Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Uniqueness of a Cournot Equilibrium
• A New Proof of the Existence and Uniqueness of the Cournot Equilibrium

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