Collective behavior in the Stackelberg model under incomplete information

DOI10.1134/S0005117917090077zbMath1386.91090OpenAlexW2754073274MaRDI QIDQ1687012

D. G. Algazina, G. I. Algazin

Publication date: 18 December 2017

Published in: Automation and Remote Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1134/s0005117917090077

zbMATH Keywords

collective behaviorStackelberg modelmarginal costsinformational equilibriumrefining perceptions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (8)

Reflexive dynamics in the Cournot oligopoly under uncertainty ⋮ Reflexion processes and equilibrium in an oligopoly model with a leader ⋮ To the analytical investigation of the convergence conditions of the processes of reflexive collective behavior in oligopoly models ⋮ Reflexive analysis of equilibria in a triopoly game with linear cost functions of the agents ⋮ Stability of Equilibrium Prices in a Dynamic Duopoly Bertrand Game with Asymmetric Information and Cluster Spillovers ⋮ Coordination of collective actions by using the Stackelberg strategy ⋮ Influence of reflexion on the properties of equilibria in a nonlinear Stackelberg oligopoly model ⋮ Analysis of equilibria in a nonlinear oligopoly model

Cites Work

• On organization of markets of homogeneous goods
• Behavior dynamics of systems with a large number of goal-seeking elements
• Models of strategic behavior
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