Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
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Publication:1691346
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.013zbMath1398.91367OpenAlexW2766421488MaRDI QIDQ1691346
Publication date: 16 January 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.013
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)
Related Items (6)
A market design approach to job rotation ⋮ Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems ⋮ On two mechanisms in job rotation problems ⋮ Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities ⋮ Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities ⋮ Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties
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