Constitutions and groups
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Publication:1691356
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.022zbMath1393.91125OpenAlexW2735274974MaRDI QIDQ1691356
Ana Mauleon, Nils Roehl, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
Publication date: 16 January 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://alfresco.uclouvain.be/share/proxy/alfresco/slingshot/node/content/workspace/SpacesStore/d13d43c0-3bd4-4677-8f84-803a91706226/coredp2017_22web.pdf
Related Items (4)
Network formation with myopic and farsighted players ⋮ Paths to stability for overlapping group structures ⋮ Efficiency and stability in a process of teams formation ⋮ Impact of utilities on the structures of stable networks with ordered group partitioning
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