Errors can increase cooperation in finite populations
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Publication:1691361
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.023zbMath1393.91013OpenAlexW2770239375MaRDI QIDQ1691361
Publication date: 16 January 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.023
uncertaintylearningcooperationevolutionary game theorybounded rationalityevolutionary dynamicsprisoner's dilemma
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Errors can increase cooperation in finite populations ⋮ Asymmetrical expectations of future interaction and cooperation in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game
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