Will any gossip do? Gossip does not need to be perfectly accurate to promote trust

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.015zbMath1393.91031OpenAlexW2761760483WikidataQ57935152 ScholiaQ57935152MaRDI QIDQ1691367

Kim Peters, Miguel A. Fonseca

Publication date: 16 January 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10871/30564

zbMATH Keywords

trustexperimentcommunicationgossip

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (1)

Gossip and the efficiency of interactions

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

Cites Work

• Fostering cooperation through the enhancement of own vulnerability
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Gossip and the efficiency of interactions
• Trust, reciprocity, and social history
• Value homophily benefits cooperation but motivates employing incorrect social information
• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed

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