The changing of common priors in sequential auctions

DOI10.1007/S11424-016-4295-1zbMath1380.91084OpenAlexW2511928668MaRDI QIDQ1691945

Heng Qiao, Jun Ma

Publication date: 25 January 2018

Published in: Journal of Systems Science and Complexity (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11424-016-4295-1

zbMATH Keywords

sequential auctionsfirst-price sealed-bid auctionprivate-value paradigm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Inequalities; stochastic orderings (60E15) Generalizations of martingales (60G48) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Sequential auctions with synergies: the paradox of positive synergies
• Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions
• Declining valuations in sequential auctions
• The declining price anomaly
• Budget constraints in homogenous multi-unit auctions
• Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders
• A First Course in Order Statistics

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