Endogenous ambiguity in cheap talk

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2017.10.007zbMath1400.91110OpenAlexW2767092270MaRDI QIDQ1693178

Christian Kellner, Mark T. Le Quement

Publication date: 11 January 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/415577/1/EACTfinsub2.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

ambiguitycheap talk

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (11)

Persuasion under ambiguity ⋮ Dynamic semi-consistency ⋮ Relative maximum likelihood updating of ambiguous beliefs ⋮ Endogenous ambiguity in cheap talk ⋮ Recursive non-expected utility: connecting ambiguity attitudes to risk preferences and the level of ambiguity ⋮ Ambiguous persuasion ⋮ Modes of ambiguous communication ⋮ Robust bidding and revenue in descending price auctions ⋮ Cheap talk with private signal structures ⋮ Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium ⋮ Reacting to ambiguous messages: an experimental analysis

Cites Work

• A dynamic Ellsberg urn experiment
• Ellsberg games
• Ambiguous act equilibria
• Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium existence in games with incomplete information
• Intentional vagueness
• Expected utility with purely subjective non-additive probabilities
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Equilibrium in beliefs under uncertainty
• Endogenous ambiguity in cheap talk
• Modes of ambiguous communication
• Information transmission in nested sender-receiver games
• Dynamic choice under ambiguity
• Updating Ambiguity Averse Preferences
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Mechanism Design With Ambiguous Communication Devices
• A Smooth Model of Decision Making under Ambiguity

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