Dynamic adverse selection with a patient seller
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Publication:1693184
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2017.10.009zbMath1400.91209OpenAlexW2766375153MaRDI QIDQ1693184
Publication date: 11 January 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://boris.unibe.ch/122193/1/rentandsell_lowprior05_revrev01.pdf
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (4)
Repeated contracting without commitment ⋮ Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment ⋮ Optimal priority pricing by a durable goods monopolist ⋮ Screening by mode of trade
Cites Work
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- Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1
- A Multistage Model of Bargaining
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- Bargaining over a Menu of Wage Contracts
- Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
- Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations
- Contract Negotiation and the Coase Conjecture: A Strategic Foundation for Renegotiation-Proof Contracts
- Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information
- An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design
- Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement
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