The effects and incentive of vertical mergers: an analysis from the view of OM

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2017.04.020zbMath1380.91091OpenAlexW2608313841MaRDI QIDQ1695025

Pengyu Chen, Xuxia Zou, He Xu

Publication date: 6 February 2018

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.04.020

zbMATH Keywords

game theorysupply chain managementCournot competitionvertical mergermarket foreclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items (2)

Management and takeover decisions ⋮ The shelf space and pricing strategies for a retailer-dominated supply chain with consignment based revenue sharing contracts

Cites Work

• Vertical integration with endogenous contract leadership: stability and fair profit allocation
• Effects of upstream and downstream mergers on supply chain profitability
• Mergers and acquisitions between risk-averse parties
• Hedging and Vertical Integration in Electricity Markets
• Competition and Structure in Serial Supply Chains with Deterministic Demand
• On the Effects of Downstream Entry
• The value of losing control: Competition in markets for complements
• The effect of vertical integration on consumer price in the presence of inventory costs.

This page was built for publication: The effects and incentive of vertical mergers: an analysis from the view of OM