Default and liquidation timing under asymmetric information

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2017.05.038zbMath1380.90143OpenAlexW2562949516MaRDI QIDQ1695046

Michi Nishihara, Takashi Shibata

Publication date: 6 February 2018

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11094/56585

zbMATH Keywords

real optionsfinancebankruptcycapital structureinformation asymmetries

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (6)

Dynamic bankruptcy procedure with asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders ⋮ The effects of asset liquidity on dynamic sell-out and bankruptcy decisions ⋮ Structural recovery of face value at default ⋮ CREDIT SPREAD AND LIQUIDATION VALUE-BASED DEBT FINANCING CONSTRAINT ⋮ Liquidation, fire sales, and acquirers' private information ⋮ FINANCING AND INVESTMENT STRATEGIES UNDER CREDITOR-MAXIMIZED LIQUIDATION

Cites Work

• Venture capital, staged financing and optimal funding policies under uncertainty
• Interactions between investment timing and management effort under asymmetric information: costs and benefits of privatized firms
• The impact of voluntary disclosure on a firm's investment policy
• Dynamic investment and capital structure under manager-shareholder conflict
• The agency problem between the owner and the manager in real investment: The bonus-audit relationship
• Asset sale, debt restructuring, and liquidation
• Investment timing, asymmetric information, and audit structure: a real options framework
• Investment timing, debt structure, and financing constraints
• A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem

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