Epsilon-stability in school choice

DOI10.1007/S00355-017-1060-XzbMath1392.91128OpenAlexW2617533158MaRDI QIDQ1697834

Chao Huang, Ziwei Wang, Qianfeng Tang

Publication date: 20 February 2018

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1060-x

zbMATH Keywords

ordinal preferenceschool choicecardinal scoreepsilon-stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea
• On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm
• Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission
• Matching mechanisms and matching quality: evidence from a top university in China
• School Choice with Consent^*
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Stable Matching in Large Economies
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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