The likelihood of a Condorcet winner in the logrolling setting

DOI10.1007/s00355-017-1063-7zbMath1392.91054OpenAlexW2600400701MaRDI QIDQ1697837

Michel Le Breton, Dominique Lepelley, William V. Gehrlein

Publication date: 20 February 2018

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/25685/1/wp_tse_755.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Condorcet winnerlogrolling setting probability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Voting paradoxes and group coherence. The Condorcet efficiency of voting rules.
• Choosing from a large tournament
• Logrolling and a McGarvey theorem for separable tournaments
• Exploiting polyhedral symmetries in social choice
• A Random Voting Graph Almost Surely has a Hamiltonian Cycle when the Number of Alternatives is Large
• Condorcet’s Paradox

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