Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results
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Publication:1697842
DOI10.1007/s00355-017-1068-2zbMath1392.91113OpenAlexW3123711195MaRDI QIDQ1697842
Publication date: 20 February 2018
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1068-2
Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (4)
All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof ⋮ Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange ⋮ Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences ⋮ Non-bossiness
Cites Work
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- An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
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- Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good
- Strategy-proof allotment rules
- The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
- A maximal domain for the existence of strategy-proof rules
- Two derivations of the uniform rule and an application to bankruptcy
- On the constancy of bribe-proof solutions
- Manipulation through bribes
- Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- One-sided population monotonicity, separability, and the uniform rule
- Distributional properties of the uniform rule in economies with single-peaked preferences
- Bribe-proof reallocation with single-peaked preferences
- Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules in allotment economies
- Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
- Bribe-proof rules in the division problem
- More on the uniform rule: characterizations without Pareto optimality
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Fair Net Trades
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
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