Authenticated confidential channel establishment and the security of TLS-DHE

DOI10.1007/s00145-016-9248-2zbMath1386.94095OpenAlexW2571675338MaRDI QIDQ1698403

Sven Schäge, Florian Kohlar, Tibor Jager, Jorg Schwenk

Publication date: 15 February 2018

Published in: Journal of Cryptology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-016-9248-2

zbMATH Keywords

authenticated key exchangeauthenticated confidential channel establishment (ACCE)sslTLS-DHE

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

Related Items (4)

Signed Diffie-Hellman key exchange with tight security ⋮ Flexible Authenticated and Confidential Channel Establishment (fACCE): Analyzing the Noise Protocol Framework ⋮ Key-schedule security for the TLS 1.3 standard ⋮ Signed (group) Diffie-Hellman key exchange with tight security

Uses Software

• HMQV
• NAXOS
• EasyCrypt
• ASPIER

Cites Work

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