Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games
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Publication:1698957
DOI10.1007/s11238-017-9586-zzbMath1395.91017OpenAlexW2584155954MaRDI QIDQ1698957
Eric Rémila, Philippe Solal, Sylvain Béal
Publication date: 16 February 2018
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-017-9586-z
Related Items
Coalitional desirability and the equal division value, Group contributions in TU-games: a class of \(k\)-lateral Shapley values, The Egalitarian efficient extension of the Aumann-Drèze value, Two-step Shapley-solidarity value for cooperative games with coalition structure, The \(\alpha \)-egalitarian Myerson value of games with communication structure, A new value for cooperative games based on coalition size, Axiomatic characterizations of the egalitarian solidarity values, Extension of generalized solidarity values to interval-valued cooperative games, Procedural and optimization implementation of the weighted ENSC value, The Efficient, Symmetric and Linear Values for Cooperative Games and Their Characterizations, New Characterizations of the Discounted Shapley Values
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