A note on budget constraints and outside options in common agency

DOI10.1007/S11238-017-9587-YzbMath1395.91012OpenAlexW2587478711MaRDI QIDQ1698958

Chiu Yu Ko

Publication date: 16 February 2018

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-017-9587-y

zbMATH Keywords

coalition-proof Nash equilibriumsubgame perfectioncommon agencyoutside optionbudget constrainttruthful Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• On cores and indivisibility
• Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency

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