An equilibrium model for the cement sector: EU-ETS analysis with power contracts

DOI10.1007/s10479-016-2200-xzbMath1415.91196OpenAlexW2343942567MaRDI QIDQ1699073

Marco Rocco, Rossana Riccardi, Elisabetta Allevi, Giorgia Oggioni

Publication date: 16 February 2018

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-016-2200-x

zbMATH Keywords

generalized Nash gamecement sector competitivenesscomplementarity modelingEU-ETSlong-term power contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Uses Software

• PATH Solver

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Complementarity problems in GAMS and the PATH solver
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• Generalized Nash equilibrium problems
• Network economics. A variational inequality approach.