On the profit-maximizing for transaction platforms in crowd sensing

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-71150-8_6zbMath1470.90042OpenAlexW2769742896MaRDI QIDQ1699763

Guangshuo Chen, Xi Luo, Linghe Kong, Min-You Wu, Jialiang Lu

Publication date: 26 February 2018

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71150-8_6

zbMATH Keywords

assignment problemHungarian algorithmBayesian gameincentive mechanism designcrowd sensing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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