On the value of persuasion by experts

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2017.12.001zbMath1400.91102OpenAlexW2205576041MaRDI QIDQ1701027

Odilon Câmara, Ricardo J. Alonso

Publication date: 22 February 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/58677/1/Alonso_Camara_On-the-value-of-persuasion-by-experts_2014.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

expertsBayesian persuasioninformation design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (8)

Persuasion under ambiguity ⋮ Algorithmic Aspects of Private Bayesian Persuasion. ⋮ Testing, disclosure and approval ⋮ On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals ⋮ Constrained persuasion with private information ⋮ Pivotal persuasion ⋮ Majoritarian preference, Utilitarian welfare and public information in Cournot oligopoly ⋮ Persuasion with costly precision

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