On an equilibrium problem with complementarity constraints formulation of pay-as-clear electricity market with demand elasticity

DOI10.1007/s10898-017-0595-9zbMath1384.49032OpenAlexW2772110183MaRDI QIDQ1702865

Didier Aussel, Rossana Riccardi, Elisabetta Allevi

Publication date: 1 March 2018

Published in: Journal of Global Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10898-017-0595-9

zbMATH Keywords

electricity marketgeneralized Nash equilibrium problemelastic demand

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Variational inequalities (49J40) Nonsmooth analysis (49J52) Set-valued and variational analysis (49J53) Applications of optimal control and differential games (49N90) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (6)

Solving quadratic multi-leader-follower games by smoothing the follower's best response ⋮ Extensions of Nash Games in Finite and Infinite Dimensions with Applications ⋮ Multiscale control of Stackelberg games ⋮ Value at risk approach to producer's best response in an electricity market with uncertain demand ⋮ A Short State of the Art on Multi-Leader-Follower Games ⋮ Bilevel Optimization: Theory, Algorithms, Applications and a Bibliography

Cites Work

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