Power at general equilibrium

DOI10.1007/s00355-017-1091-3zbMath1392.91115OpenAlexW2766624332MaRDI QIDQ1703361

Hans Gersbach, Hans H. Haller

Publication date: 2 March 2018

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1091-3

zbMATH Keywords

general equilibrium modelindividual powerutilitarian welfare weightutility gain

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cites Work

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