Privacy in implementation

DOI10.1007/s00355-017-1095-zzbMath1392.91055OpenAlexW1598837934MaRDI QIDQ1703368

Ronen Gradwohl

Publication date: 2 March 2018

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1095-z

zbMATH Keywords

privacy protectionextensive-form mechanismnormal-form mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

Voting in the limelight ⋮ Menu mechanisms ⋮ Communication with endogenous deception costs ⋮ The Empirical Implications of Privacy-Aware Choice

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