The limit to behavioral inertia and the power of default in voluntary contribution games

DOI10.1007/s00355-017-1036-xzbMath1392.91016OpenAlexW2589661434WikidataQ59614863 ScholiaQ59614863MaRDI QIDQ1704051

Jia Liu, Yohanes E. Riyanto

Publication date: 8 March 2018

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1036-x

zbMATH Keywords

experimentpublic goods gamevoluntary contribution gamebehavioral inertiapower of default

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Experimental studies (91A90)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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