Interpersonal comparison necessary for Arrovian aggregation

DOI10.1007/s00355-017-1048-6zbMath1392.91071OpenAlexW2187787500MaRDI QIDQ1704060

Hirofumi Yamamura

Publication date: 8 March 2018

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1048-6

zbMATH Keywords

Arrovian aggregationinterpersonal comparisonsocial welfare functionalinformational structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Cardinal utility, utilitarianism, and a class of invariance axioms in welfare analysis
• On intra- and interpersonal utility comparisons
• Welfare inequalities and Rawlsian axiomatics
• Leximin and utilitarian rules: A joint characterization
• The structure of iteration groups of continuous functions
• Social welfare orderings for ratio-scale measurable utilities
• Welfarism and information invariance
• On the informational basis of social choice
• Social Choice with Interpersonal Utility Comparisons: A Diagrammatic Introduction
• Possibility Theorems with Interpersonally Comparable Welfare Levels
• Interpersonal Comparability and Social Choice Theory
• Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle
• Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice
• On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis
• A Theorem on Utilitarianism
• On Interpersonal Comparability and Social Welfare Orderings
• Equity in Two Person Situations: Some Consequences

This page was built for publication: Interpersonal comparison necessary for Arrovian aggregation