Interpersonal comparison necessary for Arrovian aggregation
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Publication:1704060
DOI10.1007/s00355-017-1048-6zbMath1392.91071OpenAlexW2187787500MaRDI QIDQ1704060
Publication date: 8 March 2018
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1048-6
Cites Work
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