Games of corruption in preventing the overuse of common-pool resources

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.06.001zbMath1382.91059OpenAlexW2624571048WikidataQ46353162 ScholiaQ46353162MaRDI QIDQ1704228

Yoh Iwasa, Marko Jusup, Joung Hun Lee

Publication date: 9 March 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.06.001

zbMATH Keywords

resource managementillegal loggingbribedelegated enforcementoverfishing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Ecology (92D40)

Related Items (6)

Bribery games on interdependent complex networks ⋮ The dynamics of corruption under an optional external supervision service ⋮ Fear induced explosive transitions in the dynamics of corruption ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a population with probabilistic corrupt enforcers and violators ⋮ Evolutionary Dynamics of Cooperation in a Corrupt Society with Anti-Corruption Control ⋮ Waves of infection emerging from coupled social and epidemiological dynamics

Cites Work

• The survival of the conformist: social pressure and renewable resource management
• Social control and the social contract: the emergence of sanctioning systems for collective action
• Trade liberalization, corruption, and environmental policy formation: Theory and evidence.
• Graduated punishment is efficient in resource management if people are heterogeneous
• Games of corruption: how to suppress illegal logging

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