Adding noise to the institution: an experimental welfare investigation of the contribution-based grouping mechanism

DOI10.1007/s00355-017-1081-5zbMath1392.91084OpenAlexW2754697090WikidataQ92952617 ScholiaQ92952617MaRDI QIDQ1704406

Dirk Helbing, Stefano Balietti, Ryan O. Murphy, Heinrich H. Nax

Publication date: 9 March 2018

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1081-5

zbMATH Keywords

contribution-based grouping mechanismfuzzy mechanismmeritocratic matchingreal-world institutionwelfare experiment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

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• Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence
• Fuzzy preferences and social choice
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Fuzzy Sets and Social Choice
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
• Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment

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