The supercovering relation, the pairwise winner, and more missing links between Borda and Condorcet
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Publication:1704412
DOI10.1007/s00355-017-1086-0zbMath1392.91067OpenAlexW2755991973MaRDI QIDQ1704412
Bernard De Baets, Raúl Pérez-Fernández
Publication date: 9 March 2018
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1086-0
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