The price of `one person, one vote'
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Publication:1704413
DOI10.1007/s00355-017-1087-zzbMath1392.91031OpenAlexW2758596791MaRDI QIDQ1704413
Publication date: 9 March 2018
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1087-z
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