The probabilistic no miracles argument

DOI10.1007/s13194-015-0122-0zbMath1382.03034OpenAlexW2125226087WikidataQ30376885 ScholiaQ30376885MaRDI QIDQ1705321

Peng Zhang

Publication date: 15 March 2018

Published in: European Journal for Philosophy of Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-015-0122-0

zbMATH Keywords

scientific realismBayesian epistemologybase rate fallacyno miracles argumentstability of scientific theories

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01) Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10)

Related Items (2)

The no miracles argument without the base rate fallacy ⋮ Realism and empirical equivalence

Cites Work

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• Confirmation as partial entailment: a representation theorem in inductive logic
• The No Alternatives Argument
• How to Tell When Simpler, More Unified, or LessAd HocTheories will Provide More Accurate Predictions
• Statistical Evidence
• The semantic or model-theoretic view of theories and scientific realism

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