Fair student placement

DOI10.1007/s11238-017-9598-8zbMath1395.91336OpenAlexW2603415787MaRDI QIDQ1706794

José Alcalde, Antonio Romero-Medina

Publication date: 28 March 2018

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/25208

zbMATH Keywords

student placementfair matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of graph theory (05C90) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (5)

Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets ⋮ Essentially stable matchings ⋮ School choice with transferable student characteristics ⋮ Obvious manipulations ⋮ Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice

Cites Work

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• Making just school assignments
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• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.

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