The class of ASN-position values. Centrality and consequences of connection failure

DOI10.1007/S00355-017-1074-4zbMath1392.91006OpenAlexW2743691608MaRDI QIDQ1707110

Julia Belau

Publication date: 28 March 2018

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1074-4

zbMATH Keywords

class of ASN-position valuescooperative allocation rulesTU-games with network structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of graph theory (05C90) Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Related Items (1)

Marginality and Myerson values

Cites Work

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