Deontic modals: why abandon the default approach
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Publication:1707219
DOI10.1007/s10670-017-9879-1zbMath1417.03065OpenAlexW2586272142MaRDI QIDQ1707219
Publication date: 29 March 2018
Published in: Erkenntnis (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-017-9879-1
Modal logic (including the logic of norms) (03B45) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)
Related Items (3)
Cites Work
- Dyadic deontic detachment
- A logic for default reasoning
- Moral dilemmas and nonmonotonic logic
- Two approaches to the formalisation of defeasible deontic reasoning
- Contrary-to-duty obligations
- Propositional calculus for contradictory deductive systems
- Defaults with priorities
- Norm Change in the Common Law
- Reasoning with Moral Conflicts
- Logic for Equivocators
- An Analysis of some Deontic Logics
- Handbook of philosophical logic. Vol. 3.
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