Intertemporal versus spatial externalities in counterterror policy games

DOI10.1007/S13235-016-0188-0zbMath1391.91144OpenAlexW2337627091MaRDI QIDQ1707452

Emilson C. D. Silva, João Ricardo Faria, Daniel G. Arce

Publication date: 3 April 2018

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-016-0188-0

zbMATH Keywords

counterterrorismspatial spilloverscoordination failureshistory-dependent preferencesintertemporal spillovers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (1)

The path of terror attacks

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Rational demand and expenditures patterns under habit formation
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• A Habit Forming Optimal Growth Model
• Terror Cycles
• Foundations of Intrinsic Habit Formation
• Public Finance in Models of Economic Growth
• Global Implications of Self-Oriented National Monetary Rules
• Incentive Stackelberg Strategies for a Dynamic Game on Terrorism
• Optimal Growth with Intertemporally Dependent Preferences

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