Cooperative and noncooperative extraction in a common pool with habit formation

DOI10.1007/s13235-016-0192-4zbMath1391.91137OpenAlexW2405560138MaRDI QIDQ1707456

Sébastien Rouillon

Publication date: 3 April 2018

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-016-0192-4

zbMATH Keywords

differential gamessocial statuscommon-propertynonrenewable resourcehabits

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (1)

Growth and insecure private property of capital

Cites Work

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• Utility Function and Optimum Consumption in the models with Habit Formation and Catching up with the Joneses
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