Finding an optimal Nash equilibrium to the multi-agent project scheduling problem
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Publication:1707826
DOI10.1007/s10951-017-0516-2zbMath1391.90245OpenAlexW2595729562MaRDI QIDQ1707826
Přemysl Šucha, Sandra Ulrich Ngueveu, Cyril Briand
Publication date: 4 April 2018
Published in: Journal of Scheduling (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10951-017-0516-2
Mixed integer programming (90C11) Noncooperative games (91A10) Linear programming (90C05) Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) Performance evaluation, queueing, and scheduling in the context of computer systems (68M20)
Related Items (4)
Integer programming methods to identify Nash equilibrium solutions for platform-based scheduling games ⋮ Sharing delay costs in stochastic scheduling problems with delays ⋮ Nash equilibrium solutions in multi-agent project scheduling with milestones ⋮ Price of anarchy and price of stability in multi-agent project scheduling
Uses Software
Cites Work
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