The problem of logical omniscience, the preface paradox, and doxastic commitments

DOI10.1007/s11229-015-0979-7zbMath1382.03025OpenAlexW2279763177MaRDI QIDQ1708774

Niels Skovgaard-Olsen

Publication date: 27 March 2018

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0979-7

zbMATH Keywords

rationalityBrandominferentialismreasonspsychology of reasoningdoxastic commitmentsproblem of logical omniscience

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Cites Work

• Dialogue structure and logical expressivism
• Speech acts, commitment and multi-agent communication
• The Buridanian Account of Inferential Relations between Doubly Quantified Propositions: a Proof of Soundness
• Procrustes Problems
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

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