Vague credence

DOI10.1007/s11229-015-0782-5zbMath1417.03085OpenAlexW3193099455MaRDI QIDQ1708891

Aidan Lyon

Publication date: 27 March 2018

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0782-5

zbMATH Keywords

aggregationsubjective probabilityvaguenesscredencedegree of beliefimpreciseindeterminate

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Fuzzy logic; logic of vagueness (03B52) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Related Items (1)

Credence for conclusions: a brief for Jeffrey's rule

Cites Work

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