Simulatable channels: extended security that is universally composable and easier to prove

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-03332-3_19zbMath1447.94030OpenAlexW2898381248MaRDI QIDQ1710688

Jean Paul Degabriele, Marc Fischlin

Publication date: 23 January 2019

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03332-3_19

zbMATH Keywords

universal composabilitySSHsecure channelsciphertext fragmentationsubtle authenticated encryption

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

Related Items (1)

Overloading the nonce: rugged PRPs, nonce-set AEAD, and order-resilient channels

Cites Work

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• Plaintext-Dependent Decryption: A Formal Security Treatment of SSH-CTR
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• Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2003
• Fast Software Encryption

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