How to apply penalties to avoid delays in projects

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2018.11.056zbMath1431.91074OpenAlexW2902238082WikidataQ128875967 ScholiaQ128875967MaRDI QIDQ1713753

Gustavo Bergantiños, Leticia Lorenzo

Publication date: 28 January 2019

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/104574/1/MPRA_paper_104574.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryPERTdelayspenalties

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items (4)

Hart and Mas-Colell consistency in PERT problems ⋮ Sharing delay costs in stochastic scheduling problems with delays ⋮ Sequential bankruptcy problems ⋮ Nash equilibrium solutions in multi-agent project scheduling with milestones

Cites Work

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