Asymmetric evolutionary game dynamics based on individuals' own volition

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.05.012zbMath1406.91036OpenAlexW2809428546WikidataQ56976950 ScholiaQ56976950MaRDI QIDQ1714166

Qiao-Qiao He, Ting Ji, Yi Tao, Tian-Jiao Feng, Bo-Yu Zhang

Publication date: 31 January 2019

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.05.012

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary dynamicsreplicator model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cites Work

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• Evolutionary Games in Economics
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics

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