Revenue-sharing clubs provide economic insurance and incentives for sustainability in common-pool resource systems

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2018.06.003zbMath1406.91298OpenAlexW2806459797WikidataQ56976846 ScholiaQ56976846MaRDI QIDQ1714188

James R. Watson, Andrew R. Tilman, Simon A. Levin

Publication date: 31 January 2019

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.06.003

zbMATH Keywords

common-pool resourceinsuranceriskcooperationsustainabilityagent-based modelfisheries managementhuman behaviorcomplex adaptive systemssocial-ecological systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (1)

Evolution of cooperation with nonlinear environment feedback in repeated public goods game

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Evolutionary dynamics of collective index insurance
• The survival of the conformist: social pressure and renewable resource management
• An intergenerational common pool resource experiment
• Pairwise comparison and selection temperature in evolutionary game dynamics
• Optimal risk sharing with background risk
• Putting free-riding to work: A partnership solution to the common-property problem
• A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-Ecological Systems
• OPTIMAL RISK SHARING FOR LAW INVARIANT MONETARY UTILITY FUNCTIONS

This page was built for publication: Revenue-sharing clubs provide economic insurance and incentives for sustainability in common-pool resource systems