A solution for private assessment in indirect reciprocity using solitary observation

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.06.018zbMath1406.91049OpenAlexW2810141651WikidataQ57467605 ScholiaQ57467605MaRDI QIDQ1714245

Isamu Okada, Tatsuya Sasaki, Yutaka Nakai

Publication date: 31 January 2019

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.06.018

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theoryprivate informationevolution of cooperationindirect reciprocity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (5)

A second-order stability analysis for the continuous model of indirect reciprocity ⋮ Evolutionary games and applications: fifty years of `the logic of animal conflict' ⋮ Indirect reciprocity with abductive reasoning ⋮ Hybrid assessment scheme based on the stern-judging rule for maintaining cooperation under indirect reciprocity ⋮ A review of theoretical studies on indirect reciprocity

Cites Work

• Effect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging in indirect reciprocity
• Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions and private information
• The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity
• A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
• Indirect reciprocity among imperfect individuals
• How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
• The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation
• The good, the bad and the discriminator -- errors in direct and indirect reciprocity
• The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
• The evolution of norms
• The importance of subjectivity in perceptual errors on the emergence of indirect reciprocity
• Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation
• Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions
• Two wrongs don't make a right: the initial viability of different assessment rules in the evolution of indirect reciprocity
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• The Calculus of Selfishness

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