Equivalences between two matching models: stability

DOI10.3934/jdg.2018013zbMath1406.91281OpenAlexW2800458362MaRDI QIDQ1714490

Paola Belén Manasero

Publication date: 1 February 2019

Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2018013

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitylattice structuresubstitutable preferencesmany-to-many matching modelresponsive preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

Binary operations for the lattice structure in a many-to-many matching model

Cites Work

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