The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.11.013zbMath1406.91055OpenAlexW1992091346WikidataQ48940373 ScholiaQ48940373MaRDI QIDQ1715272

Karl Sigmund, Satoshi Uchida

Publication date: 4 February 2019

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/9431/1/IR-10-054.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

replicator dynamicsprisoner's dilemma gameleading eightsecond-order assessment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (21)

Evolving cooperation ⋮ The conflict of social norms may cause the collapse of cooperation: indirect reciprocity with opposing attitudes towards in-group favoritism ⋮ Effect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging in indirect reciprocity ⋮ Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions and private information ⋮ Robustness of linkage strategy that leads to large-scale cooperation ⋮ How fear of future outcomes affects social dynamics ⋮ Participation costs can suppress the evolution of upstream reciprocity ⋮ Two wrongs don't make a right: the initial viability of different assessment rules in the evolution of indirect reciprocity ⋮ Linkage based on the \textit{kandori} norm successfully sustains cooperation in social dilemmas ⋮ Evolution of cooperation with peer punishment under prospect theory ⋮ Value homophily benefits cooperation but motivates employing incorrect social information ⋮ Indirect reciprocity in three types of social dilemmas ⋮ Effect of memory, intolerance, and second-order reputation on cooperation ⋮ A solution for private assessment in indirect reciprocity using solitary observation ⋮ Hybrid assessment scheme based on the stern-judging rule for maintaining cooperation under indirect reciprocity ⋮ A review of theoretical studies on indirect reciprocity ⋮ The evolution of morals under indirect reciprocity ⋮ Learning to cooperate via indirect reciprocity ⋮ Promote or hinder? The role of punishment in the emergence of cooperation ⋮ Indirect reciprocity with optional games and monitoring of interactions between defectors ⋮ Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions

Cites Work

• Social norms and random matching games
• Evolution of indirect reciprocity by social information: the role of trust and reputation in evolution of altruism
• A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
• Indirect reciprocity among imperfect individuals
• How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
• The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation
• The good, the bad and the discriminator -- errors in direct and indirect reciprocity
• The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
• The evolution of norms
• The importance of subjectivity in perceptual errors on the emergence of indirect reciprocity
• Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation
• Evolution of indirect reciprocity in groups of various sizes and comparison with direct reciprocity
• Three-person game facilitates indirect reciprocity under image scoring
• Sequences of Games with Varying Opponents
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics

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