Competition and cooperation in the exploitation of the groundwater resource
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Publication:1715601
DOI10.1007/S10203-018-0217-0zbMath1419.91544OpenAlexW2895542324WikidataQ129163983 ScholiaQ129163983MaRDI QIDQ1715601
Marta Biancardi, Lucia Maddalena
Publication date: 29 January 2019
Published in: Decisions in Economics and Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10203-018-0217-0
Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)
Related Items (7)
Groundwater exploitation and illegal behaviors in a differential game ⋮ Groundwater management and illegality in a differential-evolutionary framework ⋮ Some reflections on past and future of nonlinear dynamics in economics and finance ⋮ Water taxes and fines imposed on legal and illegal firms exploiting groudwater ⋮ Groundwater extraction among overlapping generations: a differential game approach ⋮ Inter-temporal decisions, optimal taxation and non-compliant behaviors in groundwater management ⋮ An evolutionary game on compliant and non-compliant firms in groundwater exploitation
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